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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are bad deficits and there are good deficits.  What makes a 
fiscal deficit good or bad depends on both the context in which the 
deficit is run and the reason that the deficit is rising.1  The belief that it 
is unquestionably foolish to adopt policies that directly or indirectly 
increase the government’s annual borrowing on the financial markets 
— which is what it means to run a budget deficit2 — is not the 
universal truth that the current conventional wisdom might imply.  
Budget deficits are potentially dangerous and must be monitored 
carefully, but they are not always, inevitably, completely, and 
irreversibly horrific.  Far from it.  For example, just as families can 
sensibly take out mortgages to buy homes and float student loans to 
finance higher education, so too can governments borrow money to 
finance investments that will produce greater returns to society than 
their costs. 
Knowing that deficits are not evil incarnate raises some difficult 
questions, however, most notably whether it is dangerous for policy 
makers or economists to admit publicly that deficits might sometimes 
be the result of wise policy choices.  While there is always a danger 
that such knowledge can be distorted and misused, I argue in this 
article that we have a responsibility to adjust our public discussion of 
budget deficits to admit that there are good deficits as well as bad.  
Enhancing the discourse requires us to remind ourselves what it is 
about budget deficits that can make them harmful, both in the long 
term and the short term, as a necessary step in understanding when 
deficits can be beneficial.  Only then can we have a full and honest 
discussion of our taxing and spending policies. 
A. Our Political Fixation on the Government’s Budget Deficit 
To say that American politicians and policymakers are interested 
in — one might even say frequently preoccupied with — budget 
deficits is to state the painfully obvious.  For decades, political debate 
 1 See infra Parts II.A and C for descriptions of the conditions under which it is 
arguably wise to run a fiscal deficit. 
 2 See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term 
Deficits, 58 TAX L. REV. 275, 289 (2005) [hereinafter Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits]. 
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=976763
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has prominently included concerns about the level of the federal 
government’s annual budget deficit.3  Prior to Bill Clinton’s 
presidency, there was a partisan divide on the issue, with Democrats 
mostly showing less concern for deficits and Republicans focusing on 
the issue as evidence of their opponents’ fiscal irresponsibility.4  Since 
the early 1990s, however, both parties have aligned in their stated 
beliefs that the budget deficit is a serious problem that must be 
solved.5  Each party, naturally enough, attempts to blame the other for 
what are thought to be high deficits;6 and though it is sometimes 
politically expedient for the party in power to downplay either the size 
of deficits or their importance, it is safe to say that both major political 
parties in the United States are now united around the idea that 
deficits are a scourge that must be stopped.7
This unity of opinion in the political arena has been largely 
replicated in the world of policy analysis and public opinion.  
Nonpartisan think-tanks and advocacy groups (such as the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities,8 Citizens for Tax Justice,9 and many 
others) include fiscal policy as a major part of their focus and 
regularly express the opinion that budget deficits are a burden on the 
future.10  The “National Debt Clock” in Times Square, which has been 
 3 Linda Feldmann, Summit on Budget Deficit Called for by Greenspan, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 2, 1983, at 2 (discussing Alan Greenspan’s warning 
that the federal budget deficit posed a long-term threat to the economy). 
 4 David Hoffman, Reagan Takes His Tax Bill on Sales Trip to the West, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 12, 1982, at A1 (describing Reagan’s claim of “[forty] years of [Democrat] 
fiscal irresponsibility”). 
 5 Kenneth N. Gilpin, Clinton’s Economic Plan Finding Respect from Corporate 
America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at A1 (describing Clinton’s leadership in handling 
the “problem” of federal budget deficits). 
 6 Carolyn Lochhead, Laying Blame for the Budget Deficit, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., July 24, 1992, at A1 (discussing President George H. W. Bush’s plan to 
blame Democrats for budget deficit in order to deflect blame from himself). 
 7 Scott Cox, One of the Hottest Elections, On the Campaign Trail . . ., DAILY 
BUDGET BYTES, Oct. 16, 2006, available at www.gallerywatch.com (follow “Services” 
hyperlink) (“Doubtless, some Members [of Congress] will want to raise the issue of 
large budget deficits as a way of tarring their opponents or of stressing the need for 
fiscal responsibility.”); Jim VandeHei, Democrats Will Try a Hybrid of Old, New 
Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2004, at A01 (describing Democrats’ plan to reduce the 
federal budget deficit faster than it would be reduced under President George W. 
Bush’s plan). 
 8 See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, http://www.cbpp.org (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2006). 
 9 See Citizens for Tax Justice, http://www.ctj.org (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). 
 10 JAMES HORNEY & RICHARD KOGAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITES, 
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running since 1989,11 purports to show the up-to-the-minute aggregate 
national debt and the share of that debt borne by individual families.12  
Some have used these figures to calculate the portion borne by each 
citizen.13  Indeed, at least one major policy organization, the Concord 
Coalition,14 was founded specifically in response to concerns about the 
deficits experienced in the 1980s.  Notably, the Concord Coalition was 
founded by two former senators, the conservative Republican Warren 
Rudman and the late liberal Democrat Paul Tsongas, in part as an 
effort to demonstrate that deficit reduction should be a nonpartisan 
effort.15
Unsurprisingly, the press in general and the business press in 
particular have also largely reported the deficit story as being 
uncontroversial in terms of good and bad.  Deficits are bad and deficit 
reduction is good.16  Certainly, the press will print stories on the 
politically charged nature of the budget debate at any given time; but 
journalists seem to accept as simple fact that deficits are always bad 
and must be reduced.17
In opinion columns, the rhetoric can become colorful even from 
nonpartisan journalists.  One of the business reporters for The New 
York Times began an “Economic View” column as follows: “Never 
mind the movie.  This was the real Mission Impossible.  Could three 
dozen ordinary American adults . . . reach agreement on how to 
prevent a fiscal train wreck?”18  The column described a focus group 
DON’T POP THE CORKS — CBO OUTLOOK FOR THE FEDERAL BUDGET IS STILL BLEAK 
(Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.cbpp.org/8-17-06bud.htm; see also CITIZENS FOR TAX 
JUSTICE, 99% OF AMERICANS ARE NET LOSERS UNDER BUSH TAX AND SPENDING 
POLICIES (June 29, 2006), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/debtus.pdf (“[F]or all but the very 
wealthiest United States residents, the Bush tax cuts between 2001 and 2006 are 
outweighed by a dramatic increase in the burden of debt on American families.”). 
 11 See Niall Ferguson, Reasons to Worry, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 11, 2006, at 46. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Ed Hall, U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ 
(showing Outstanding Public Debt of $8,533,492,821,033.24 and concluding that “each 
citizen’s share of this debt is $28,491.78”) (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). 
 14 See The Concord Coalition, About Us, http://www.concordcoalition.org/about. 
html (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Are Bush and Congress Truly Ready to Slash Deficits?, KIPLINGER LETTER, 
Mar. 4, 2005 (stating that big entitlements have to be reined in to make a serious dent 
in deficits). 
 17 See, e.g., id. 
 18 Edmund L. Andrews, Public’s Deficit Fix May Stun Politicians, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 2006, § 3, at 4. 
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put together by the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, 
and the Concord Coalition that brought together a diverse group of 
citizens to “explor[e] public attitudes on the gap between taxes paid 
and promises made.”19  Reportedly, “[v]irtually no one needed to be 
persuaded that the federal budget is on an unsustainable path. . . . The 
federal deficit is likely to be ‘only’ about $300 billion this year, but 
deficits over the next [ten] years could total more than $2 trillion if 
policies remain unchanged.”20  Indeed, the point of the column was 
apparently to express amazement that regular folks are much more 
sensible about making the “tough choices” on deficit reduction than 
are their elected representatives: “So if there was a message, it was 
not that people wanted to dodge tough choices.  It was that they 
wanted good ideas from their leaders.”21
The political preoccupation with budget deficits also affects policy 
discussions even when budget effects are far from the central focus of 
analysis.  For example, a recent law review article examining the use 
of affirmative action in an auction process used by the Federal 
Communications Commission was titled: Deficit Reduction Through 
Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction 
Competition.22  The article, which is quite insightful in describing some 
counter-intuitive results of a bidding process that included credits for 
businesses owned by minorities and women, is certainly not focused 
on “the deficit.”  Indeed, the authors conclude that the use of 
affirmative action in a 1993 auction increased total revenues from the 
auction by “nearly $45 million.”23  To put this number into 
perspective, the federal budget deficit in 1993 was $255.1 billion,24 
making the $45 million in revenues from the auction less than 0.02% 
of the budget deficit. 
The authors, in fact, do not claim that $45 million is a significant 
contribution to deficit reduction, but they instead argue that 
politicians might look more kindly on a program that does not cost 
money: “The revenue-enhancing effect, however, shows that 
affirmative action may cost the government less than previously 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How 
Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REV. 761 
(1996). 
 23 Id. at 763. 
 24 CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA (2006), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.pdf. 
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thought.  Demonstrating that such measures need not drain the 
treasury might be imperative for garnering legislative support. . . . 
[T]he revenue effect . . . may establish a necessary condition for 
politically justifying [affirmative action].”25  This might well be true.  
Even so, it is noteworthy that, rather than simply saying that a 
seeming subsidy ends up being a net revenue raiser for the 
government — a fact that would be interesting no matter what the rest 
of the budget looked like — the authors chose to describe this 
program as one that results in “deficit reduction,” not only in the text 
of the article but as the first two words of its title.26  The authors 
obviously knew what their target audience was likely to find exciting, 
even if deficit reduction was decidedly beside the point. 
Again, that budget deficits are a focus of concern is not news.  
However, any time that there is such a broadly-held consensus about a 
public policy issue — particularly a public policy issue that is very 
technical and that few citizens, journalists, or politicians are actually 
likely to understand — at least two possibilities arise: first, everyone is 
right; or second, everyone believes the same thing because it is 
intuitively appealing (and maybe also simply because everyone else 
seems to believe it).  This article explores the premise of the latter 
possibility — that is, I take seriously the idea that the conventional 
wisdom that deficits are always bad is an incomplete or inaccurate 
description of the state of economic knowledge.  It is not my purpose 
here to explain how mass opinion is formed or to discern why virtually 
everyone seems to believe a half-truth.  Instead, I directly confront the 
propositions that the fiscal deficit is a bad thing and that actions must 
be taken immediately to prevent the fiscal disaster that so many 
people apparently believe is surely coming. 
B. Opposing Deficits versus Opposing Bad Fiscal Policies 
As an initial matter, it is important to set aside one category of 
arguments, specifically whether failing to be “against the deficit” 
automatically means that one approves of a particular policy that 
happens to raise the deficit.  In fact, a person could well believe that 
deficits (at least at their current levels and at the levels that are 
actually likely to exist in the future) are not the problem that they are 
made out to be, yet still believe that some changes in our current fiscal 
policy mix are necessary.  For example, repealing all or part of the 
 25 Ayres & Cramton, supra note 22, at 764. 
 26 Id. 
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various tax cuts enacted during the current President Bush’s terms in 
office would certainly reduce the deficit; but reducing the deficit is 
hardly the only reason to favor repeal of those tax cuts.  Concerns 
about income distribution, perverse incentives, and bad tax 
administration, for example, can all motivate calls for repeal of those 
specific tax bills as well as proposals for other changes in tax and 
spending policy. 
Any change in tax or spending policy affects the level and future 
path of deficits, of course, but intent matters.  If it turns out that the 
deficit is not always the problem that it is so often made out to be, that 
removes one argument from the arsenal of those who propose tax 
changes that reduce the deficit; and it removes one hurdle from those 
who disagree.  That does not by any means end the debate.  If, as I 
believe, the Bush tax cuts were a terrible mistake for reasons beyond 
their effects on deficits, then they should be repealed.  Having the 
additional argument that the deficit is a bad thing, of course, 
strengthens the case.  As it happens, the analysis in this article implies 
that while deficit spending is in some circumstances beneficial to the 
economy, the Bush tax cuts do not fall into that category and are thus 
damaging both because they are “bad deficits” and for other reasons 
as well, most prominently that they are profoundly unjust.  It is thus 
consistent to argue that deficits are not always bad but that these tax 
cuts — in addition to their other defects — lead to the bad kind of 
deficits. 
C. The Approach in this Article 
In an earlier article,27 I addressed the issues raised by long-term 
deficits from a more orthodox perspective.28  In that article, I reviewed 
some of the basic issues in the measurement of fiscal deficits,29 
described how the long-term prospects of the Social Security system 
interacted with the rest of the government’s fiscal prospects,30 and 
finally assessed a relatively new method of computing long-term fiscal 
deficits (or the “Fiscal Gap”) known as “Generational Accounting” 
that attempts to forecast the net present value of all deficits into the 
infinite future.31  I concluded that Generational Accounting was a 
fatally flawed approach to trying to predict the long-term fiscal path of 
 27 Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 2. 
 28 Id. at 286–98. 
 29 Id. at 285–98. 
 30 Id. at 298–306. 
 31 Id. at 306–22. 
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the U.S. economy.32
Rather than simply arguing that the Generational Accounting 
approach to forecasting long-term fiscal deficits was fundamentally 
flawed, though, my argument looked at the alternatives to that 
approach to see if there was something better that could guide 
policymakers.33  My conclusion was that more traditional deficit 
measures such as ten-year deficit forecasts, though still highly 
imperfect, were at least adequate to guide policymakers who were 
concerned about the possible harms that deficits might visit on the 
economy and — even more importantly — were not subject to the 
shortcomings that make Generational Accounting far too easy to 
manipulate.34  In short, it was not just that Generational Accounting 
was flawed but that those flaws were sufficiently serious that it was 
comparatively worse to use Generational Accounting than to rely on 
ten-year deficit forecasts.35
This article extends the analysis from my earlier article in two 
ways.  First, in my earlier article I basically accepted for the purposes 
of argument that deficits are per se harmful.  While it would hardly be 
surprising if my skepticism about the underlying idea that deficits are 
generally a bad thing came through to readers, the analysis was 
focused on how best to measure deficits to guide policy and not on 
whether policy should be aimed at deficit reduction in the first place.36  
I analyzed the harms of deficit spending through the traditional lens of 
“crowding out,” which (as I describe in Part II below) is the idea that 
deficits reduce future economic growth by reducing the amount of 
private investment in a given year.37
In this article, by contrast, I describe why deficits might not 
always be harmful after all, or more accurately, why they are harmful 
in certain circumstances but not in others.  Perhaps surprisingly, it is 
not difficult to find economists who have argued against the idea that 
all budget deficits should be eliminated.38  While virtually everyone 
 32 Id. at 325–26 (concluding that Generational Accounting is “based on highly 
contestable assumptions, makes questionable analytical choices, and is inherently 
incapable of providing the useful baseline that its proponents promise”). 
 33 Id. at 285–86. 
 34 Id. at 325–26. 
 35 Id. at 285 (describing the choice between ten-year budget deficits and 
Generational Accounting as “[t]he [i]mperfect vs. [t]he [f]undamentally [f]lawed”). 
 36 Id. at 325–26. 
 37 Id. at 296. 
 38 Alan S. Blinder, Is the National Debt Really — I Mean, Really — A Burden, in 
DEBT AND THE TWIN DEFICITS DEBATE 209 (James M. Rock ed., 1991) (describing 
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would agree that it is possible to run deficits that are so large that they 
harm the economy, the question is whether our current and plausible 
future policies require a commitment to significant and immediate 
deficit reduction.  I conclude that deficits can be harmful but that the 
harms need to be balanced against the benefits; and I suggest that our 
obsession with deficit reduction causes us to run the distinct risk of 
reducing deficits in ways that are far worse than not reducing them. 
Second, even if we believe that there are situations in which 
deficits are acceptable (or are even a very good idea), I raise the 
possibility that we should nonetheless engage in a “noble deception,” 
that is, that we should agree not to talk about the possible benefits of 
deficits in order to prevent the public and policy makers from jumping 
to the unwarranted conclusion that if deficits are not always bad, then 
there is no reason to worry about deficits.  This is a very real concern, 
given the sound-bite-driven nature of current political discourse.  
Ultimately, however, I conclude that deceptions — perhaps especially 
noble deceptions — are unwise and can ultimately cause more harm 
than good.  It should be possible to discipline policy debate to allow us 
to be honest about the choices we face without being doomed to make 
foolish choices based on half-truths. 
The fiscal choices that we make today affect our lives today, our 
lives in the future, and the lives of generations yet unborn.  
Understanding what is — and what is not — harmful and helpful 
about budget deficits is essential for policymakers and the public at 
large.  The budget deficit matters, but it matters in ways that are too 
often poorly understood.  The result of such misunderstanding can 
cause us to enact well-meaning policies that move us in the wrong 
direction.  Greater understanding of all of the issues raised by budget 
deficits is thus essential to good governance and prudent fiscal 
stewardship. 
II. ARE DEFICITS ALWAYS HARMFUL?  IS DEFICIT REDUCTION 
ALWAYS GOOD? 
Because of the generally low level of economic knowledge in the 
population at large and (perhaps especially) among politicians, it is at 
himself as a “middle-of-the-road, middle-class, middle-aged economist,” id. at 209, 
and describing a former congressman’s apparent surprise when three out of four 
economists testifying at a congressional hearing — one of whom was Professor 
Blinder — stated that they “would vote for $15 billion in additional spending on 
public infrastructure, if that spending would add $15 billion to the budget deficit,” id. 
at 222). 
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least possible that the near-universal aversion to deficits is based on 
little more than gut reactions to the idea that borrowing is bad 
(“neither a borrower nor a lender be”39) or that governments should 
be forced to “live within their means” just like any family must do.40  If 
those or similar concerns motivate anti-deficit feelings, though, then 
the argument is not that deficits are harmful to the economy but that 
deficits are simply immoral or irresponsible no matter whether they 
have any effect on living standards.  The argument ends there, 
because it is not really an argument but a matter of moral certitude. 
Another source of popular concern about the deficit might arise 
from some “very old-fashioned arguments that were based mostly on 
myths and misunderstandings [and that] are still an important part of 
the popular folk wisdom.”41  The economist Alan Blinder, a former 
vice-chair of the Federal Reserve and a prominent fiscal policy 
analyst, puts these arguments quickly to rest.  One argument is that 
“[i]f we borrow too much, the nation will go bankrupt,” an argument 
that may be true for some smaller economies but “not for the United 
States.”42  Because our deficits are financed by issuing debt that is 
denominated in dollars, “we can always print as many dollars as we 
need.”43  While this may be “wise or foolish,”44 any “fear of default is 
simply a red herring in the U.S. case.”45
Furthermore, any concern that deficits must necessarily be 
inflationary, even if such a concern might once have been plausible, 
“sounds silly now.”46  As Blinder points out, the experience of the 
1980s demonstrated that one could have a simultaneous increase in 
the annual budget deficit and a decline (and near-disappearance) of 
inflation.47  The U.S. experience in the decade-and-a-half since 
Blinder wrote his article further demonstrates the lack of any 
connection between the level of the deficit (which rose and fell 
 39 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3. 
 40 Robert W. Hahn, The Cost-Benefit of Budget Cutting, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 
2006, at B17 (“Our government should not only live within its means . . . . “).  Of 
course, this argument ignores the increasing frequency with which many families live 
beyond their means.  Fiscal rectitude is surely easier to preach than to practice. 
 41 Blinder, supra note 38, at 218. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 218–19. 
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dramatically over that period48) and inflation (which mostly stayed at 
the low levels reached in the 1980s49). 
Thus, two of the more widely cited reasons to believe that budget 
deficits are harmful are based on one tautologically incorrect 
argument and on another empirically discredited one.  Of course, 
many economists and well-educated policy analysts know full well that 
these arguments are simply wrong, but they have much more 
substantial concerns that cause them to advocate deficit reduction.  
That some people can oppose deficits for foolish reasons does not 
mean that others lack better reasons.  The remainder of this section 
addresses the mainstream view of deficits and then describes some 
arguments offered by economists who emphasize the value of public 
investment and thus suggest that the presence of deficits does not 
always justify the adoption of contractionary fiscal policies.50
A.  The Standard Deficit Story: “Real” and Financial51
What has become the standard analysis of budget deficits is quite 
powerful and deserves to be explained fully and sympathetically.  The 
story can be told either from a “real” or “financial” perspective.  In 
the real perspective, the focus is not on the dollars that are borrowed 
or saved but on the production of goods and services and the use of 
underlying economic resources that are affected by fiscal policy 
decisions.  “Real” is thus a term of art used to identify analyses that 
 48 CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA, tbl. 13 (2006), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.pdf (showing budget deficits as high 
as 4.5% of potential GDP and budget surpluses of as much as 2.5% of potential GDP 
since 1991). 
 49 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (showing average annual inflation 
from 1992 through 2006 ranging from 1.6% to 3.4%). 
 50 Expansionary policies include tax cuts and increases in government spending, 
both of which result in greater demand for goods and, if the economy is not at 
capacity, an expansion of the economy.  Contractionary policies include tax increases 
and cuts in government spending. 
 51 Because the standard story of deficits is so widely espoused, examples of it are 
commonplace.  See Blinder, supra note 38, at 219–21 (describing the standard story); 
see also ROBERT EISNER, THE GREAT DEFICIT SCARES: THE FEDERAL BUDGET, 
TRADE, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 3–28, 57–58 (1997) [hereinafter EISNER, DEFICIT 
SCARES]; BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING (1988) (providing a good 
book-length analysis of the standard story); Neil H. Buchanan, Taxes, Saving, and 
Macroeconomics, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 59 (1999) (describing the standard story).  The 
standard story also includes a distinction between long-run and short-run analysis 
which is not relevant to the discussion here. 
BUCHANAN.FORMATTED.5.DOC 3/17/2007  1:35 PM 
336 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  26:325 
abstract from financial market effects and focus only on quantities of 
resources and how they are used.  The government’s decision to run a 
deficit changes the use of resources in the economy, in turn changing 
the composition and (possibly) the quantity of goods and services 
produced.  These changes can have long-term effects by changing the 
way the current economic output is used to create future increases in 
productivity and output.  In the financial perspective, on the other 
hand, the focus is on the amount and use of saved funds in the 
economy, with an emphasis on how those funds are deployed to 
finance investment in future productivity and output.  Both 
perspectives suggest that deficits can be very harmful to the economy, 
especially in the long run. 
The ultimate purpose of the analysis from both perspectives, 
therefore, is to ask how our current deficits might affect future 
prosperity.  Looking at each perspective separately, however, turns 
out to lead to unique insights that are not obvious from one 
perspective alone. 
1.  The “Real” Perspective on Budget Deficits 
In any given time period, there is a limited amount of productive 
inputs available in an economy.  The number of workers is not 
literally fixed, because it is always possible to allow greater 
immigration and to bring citizens into the work force who are not 
currently working (as well as increasing the hours worked by 
currently-employed citizens).  Similarly, the amount of productive 
land, technology, factories, and machines is never fixed.  Still, the 
analysis usually proceeds from the simplifying assumption that there is 
some maximum amount of resources available to be employed in the 
production of goods and services. 
When a government decides to purchase goods and services or to 
produce them itself, it might be doing so because the resources of the 
economy are not being fully utilized, which means that the 
government can put people to work without affecting the rest of the 
economy.  This was clearly the idea behind the New Deal policies 
during the Great Depression, where there was no serious concern that 
the government’s hiring of workers would do anything but help those 
workers and, ultimately, the economy as a whole. 
If the economy is not in a depression or a recession, however, any 
resources that the government commands for its uses would, by 
assumption, be hired by some private entity.  This necessarily implies 
that a government’s purchase of goods and services (or its direct 
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employment of workers) will result in fewer goods and services being 
available for purchase by non-governmental actors, or at least that the 
composition of the economy’s output would be altered by the 
government’s choices.  For example, workers who might have been 
employed to provide catering services to private citizens could instead 
be employed by the government to work in its cafeterias.  Or private 
companies that might have produced steel rails might instead produce 
military equipment that sits unused. 
It is the latter possibility — the diversion of resources from 
productive investments — that most concerns those who argue against 
budget deficits (and against government spending in general).  
Government actions that reduce spending by private citizens on 
consumption items like food preparation involves choices about the 
current composition and distribution of goods and services — choices 
that involve important questions of policy and politics to be sure, but 
not the kind of thing that obviously has any longer-term effects.  
Making a mistake today is bad for today, but its effect is forgotten 
tomorrow.  By contrast, if the government decides to divert resources 
that would have been used to create capital goods (that is, goods and 
services that can be used to increase future output), then mistakes 
today last into the future. 
The term “crowding out” is commonly used to describe the 
problem of government use of resources in a way that reduces the 
nation’s annual investment in capital goods (commonly called simply 
“investment”).  This decrease in investment in turn implies a lower 
standard of living for future generations as a result of our decision 
today to use resources for something that will not contribute to 
further increases in economic growth. 
Hence, the real perspective highlights the impact of government 
decisions that redirect resources out of uses that would lead to more 
economic growth and into uses that simply result in more current 
consumption.  Efforts to reduce the deficit are in essence attempts to 
prevent the government from decreasing future living standards by 
making such myopic decisions. 
2.  The Financial Perspective on Budget Deficits 
The real perspective, however, begs the question of why it is 
budget deficits that harm the future prospects of the economy and not 
simply government spending itself that does the harm, no matter 
whether that spending is financed by raising taxes or by borrowing 
money and issuing debt.  If the problem is the government’s use of 
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resources, why is that not simply another argument for smaller 
government?  The financial perspective brings out the difference that 
this choice of financing creates. 
In the financial perspective, the focus of analysis is on the pool of 
saved funds available to be borrowed by private firms, private citizens, 
foreign governments, and the domestic government.  Saved funds 
represent the voluntary decisions by private actors to command fewer 
resources (that is, to buy fewer goods and services) than their incomes 
would allow them to command in a given year.  If a person earned 
$100,000 in a year and spent $90,000, the remaining $10,000 would be 
a problem if it were not spent, because that would mean that private 
companies would receive in the aggregate fewer dollars than they 
have paid out in salaries and other forms of income. 
Fortunately, the financial markets exist to cycle the saved funds 
back into the spending stream.  The aggregate amount of saving 
(except for the trivial amounts that end up under the proverbial 
mattress) is lent out to willing borrowers at market rates of interest.  
The pool of savings that is available annually is thus divided up among 
willing borrowers, with the interest rate acting as the price of 
borrowing. 
Just as the real perspective assumed that when the economy is not 
in a recession the government’s decision to command resources 
necessitated their redirection from some other use, the financial 
perspective assumes that when the economy is not in a recession the 
total amount of savings cannot be increased.  Therefore, the pool of 
savings is roughly fixed, and the government’s decision to command 
savings necessitates their redirection away from some private would-
be borrower who now finds it impossible or too expensive to borrow 
the funds. 
This is the connection to deficits that is not obvious from the real 
perspective.  When the government runs a balanced budget, it does 
not need to borrow money, so it is not involved in the market to lend 
out private savings.  When it runs a budget deficit, though, it must 
finance its spending by borrowing private savings.  Fewer savings 
remain to be borrowed by private actors, and the interest rate must 
rise by an amount sufficient to discourage some potential private 
borrowers to cancel or delay their plans to use the money that they 
now can no longer afford to borrow. 
In the financial perspective, therefore, the budget deficit 
determines the total amount of funds that the government must 
borrow, and crowding out means that the government has prevented 
private companies from borrowing money that they otherwise could 
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have spent to invest in capital goods. 
This picture is complicated a bit by the existence of foreign trade.  
If there is a roughly fixed pool of private savings from which to 
borrow, and if the government is going to borrow a certain amount of 
funds, domestic private borrowers might avoid the necessity of 
reducing their spending by borrowing from abroad.  Alternatively, the 
government itself might simply borrow from foreign lenders rather 
than domestic lenders, leaving the pool of domestic money available 
for domestic borrowers.  Either way, total domestic spending by 
private actors and government combined is larger than it could 
otherwise have been. 
The possibility of borrowing from abroad, however, does not 
mean that there is no crowding out in an important sense.  True, the 
government’s borrowing has not forced domestic borrowers to reduce 
their borrowing and spending.  However, the obligation to repay the 
foreign lenders means that some of the future income of the economy 
is now pledged to be paid to foreign actors.  The two outcomes — 
reduced domestic investment or increased obligations to foreign 
lenders — are equivalent in terms of future living standards, for a 
somewhat subtle reason. 
When private investment falls, that means essentially that 
domestic companies are building fewer factories than they otherwise 
would build (and they are buying fewer machines to place in their 
factories).  The output of the economy is thus lower than it would 
otherwise be.  By borrowing from abroad, it is true that those factories 
can be built, but to what end?  The output from the factories will, in 
the aggregate (and under some technical assumptions that are not 
germane here), be equal to the amount of money that domestic 
borrowers must pay to foreign lenders. 
In other words, a government deficit results in either a reduction 
of the future productive capacity of the economy or, in a larger future 
economy, a reduction in the amount of the economy’s output that 
domestic citizens can keep and enjoy.  In the standard view, then, so 
long as the government’s deficit does not generate a compensating 
increase in domestic private saving, future living standards are 
compromised by government borrowing.  Obviously, then, in the 
standard story on budget deficits, it is important to reduce deficits and 
certainly to avoid policy choices that would increase the deficit from 
its current level. 
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B.  Rejecting versus Amending the Standard Story 
The standard story of how fiscal deficits affect the economy is 
appealing in many ways.  It comports with the “no free lunch” logic at 
the core of economic thinking, and it forces policy analysts to think 
seriously about the possible costs of running a larger deficit.  Surely, 
many unfortunate decisions could be avoided by taking seriously the 
possibility of crowding out.  The standard story provides a powerful 
argument — perhaps a sufficient one, but surely not a necessary one 
— against the current President Bush’s tax policies.  Given the highly 
regressive composition of the various Bush tax cuts, the standard story 
highlights the nature of the tradeoff implied by the Bush-era fiscal 
policies: tax cuts today, overwhelmingly benefiting a small, highly 
affluent minority of currently-living Americans, will ultimately result 
in lower standards of living for everyone in the future.52  If one wanted 
to advocate the repeal of those tax cuts, this is powerful ammunition. 
The apparent applicability of the standard story in this context 
does not mean, however, that it is complete.  One of the profound 
dangers of the widespread acceptance of the standard story (or, worse, 
of the continuing belief by some people in the “popular folklore” 
arguments noted earlier) is that deficit reduction can be seen as per se 
good policy.  The discussion below includes some specific examples of 
the damage that flows from such a presumption.  Some 
macroeconomists, therefore, emphasize that the standard story is 
theoretically incomplete if it does not explicitly include a discussion of 
public investment. 
Before looking closely at a few of those non-mainstream views, 
though, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a virtual 
subculture of what might be called “deficit doubters” who combine 
conspiracy theories with misleading arguments (and often simply false 
factual assertions).53  Like “gold bugs,” who argue that every 
 52 TAX POLICY CTR., TAX POLICY: FACTS AND FIGURES (Oct. 2006), available at 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/template.cfm?PubID=901006 
(“Assuming [the Bush tax cuts] are either financed with spending cuts or a 
combination of reduced spending and progressive tax increases, more than 70 [%] of 
households will be net losers; only those in the top income quintile will, on average, 
benefit.”); cf. Blinder, supra note 38, at 221 (noting that the deficits of the 1980s 
financed a “consumption binge,” or “a party, to which . . . the wealthy were especially 
invited”). 
 53 To avoid conferring any credibility on these fringe groups by citing them — 
even critically — in an academic article, I will not name any here.  The interested 
reader can easily find websites for such groups by using any standard search engine on 
the internet. 
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economic problem would be solved by a return to the gold standard,54 
or tax protesters, who claim among other things that the entire U.S. 
tax system is a hoax and that only income earned abroad may be 
taxed,55 or any of a number of other single-minded conspiracy 
theorists, there are those who reject the standard view of deficits for 
reasons that defy description.  This article is clearly not devoted to 
cataloging the claims of such fringe elements.  Their very presence, 
though, unfortunately undermines those who can take issue from solid 
logic and evidence with some of the particulars of the standard story 
of the budget deficit. 
A clear step up from such groups are those who argue that the 
budget deficit is not a problem but who make such arguments by 
reference to theories that — while clearly not in the mainstream — 
have some measure of credibility.  So-called supply-side economists 
arguably fit into this category.  There are certainly respected 
politicians who have advocated the theory that tax cuts matter more 
than budget deficits (if, indeed, budget deficits matter at all),56 and 
that view continues to be heard in 21st century policy debates, such as 
Vice President Dick Cheney’s reported argument that “Reagan 
proved that deficits don’t matter.”57
The economics profession has, however, generally been unkind to 
such views.  Before he became chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors under President Bush from 2002–04 (and thus found himself 
in the possibly uncomfortable position of working in an administration 
with notable sympathy for supply-side arguments), Harvard’s Greg 
Mankiw “ridiculed the supply-side tax policies of President Ronald 
Reagan as the work of ‘charlatans and cranks.’”58
 54 Id. 
 55 Cf. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX 
ARGUMENTS (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv_tax.pdf 
(explaining that federal courts have repeatedly held that all tax protesters’ arguments 
are baseless). 
 56 See Edmund L. Andrews, A Pragmatist at Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2002, at A1 (discussing supply-side Republicans, noting that “Jack Kemp [is] a former 
cabinet secretary and an ardent advocate of tax cuts,” and quoting Stephen Moore, 
another supply-sider, who criticized a likely nominee for White House economic 
advisor as being “hypersensitive about budget deficits”).  See generally JACK KEMP, 
AN AMERICAN RENAISSANCE: A STRATEGY FOR THE 1980S (1979). 
 57 Jonathan Weisman, Reagan Policies Gave Green Light to Red Ink, WASH. 
POST, June 9, 2004, at A11 (discussing RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY (2004)). 
 58 Edmund L. Andrews, Economics Adviser Learns the Principles of Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at C4 (referring to a comment in N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS (1st ed. 1998)). 
BUCHANAN.FORMATTED.5.DOC 3/17/2007  1:35 PM 
342 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  26:325 
 
Even to those who largely disagree with supply-siders, such a 
characterization comes across as rather unfairly putting supply-siders 
in the same category as the conspiracy theorists noted above.  The 
reason that supply-side economics must be rejected, after all, is not 
that its basic theoretical assumption is perverse or illogical.  Indeed, it 
could have turned out to be true that cutting tax rates encouraged 
people to increase their economic activity so much that tax revenue 
overall would have risen when rates were decreased.59  It is the 
continued belief that such an outcome is certain — even in the face of 
continuing evidence to the contrary — that earns the derision of 
economists like Mankiw.  Because of this, supply-side believers are a 
breed apart from the academic mainstream. 
By contrast, the economists who point out that the standard 
deficit story overlooks the importance of public investment are highly 
respected within the economics community; and while some of their 
fellow economists would surely disagree on the specifics of various 
proposals for public investment, there is no serious argument that 
public spending can never be productive.  The discussion below thus 
describes not a different theory of deficits but simply the too-often-
forgotten side of the theory behind the standard story of deficits. 
C.  Public and Private Investment 
While the standard story of how deficits harm the future prospects 
of the economy through crowding out commands a great deal of 
understandable respect, the story as told above (and as usually 
described in textbooks) elides a very important assumption.  
Specifically, while the story above suggests that the amount of 
crowding out due to a deficit is exactly equal to the government deficit 
itself (that is, a $300 billion deficit causes a $300 billion reduction in 
investment), the likelihood is that the dollar amount of the budget 
deficit actually represents the upper limit on the actual amount of 
private investment that will be crowded out (and the lower limit is 
zero). 
 59 See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Rival Tax Relief Plans Reflect Stark Differences 
Between Spitzer and Faso, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at B1 (describing as “classic 
supply-side economics” the belief that “tax cuts will reinvigorate the state’s economy 
and bring people, jobs and revenue back to the state”).  Note, however, that tax 
revenue must rise in the aggregate as a result of the tax cuts for this to be a classic 
supply-side argument. 
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1.  Is Private Investment Being Crowded Out? 
The crowding out story says, in essence, that people and firms will 
reduce their investment in capital goods when they are unable to 
borrow as much as they would have liked in the financial markets.  It 
is true that they will borrow less than they might otherwise have 
wished to borrow, but not everyone was necessarily going to borrow 
exclusively for the purpose of financing the purchase of capital goods.  
If the government’s borrowing causes someone not to borrow to 
finance a consumption item, then the future is not harmed.  Again, the 
government is causing a redistribution of goods and services, but the 
effect is immediate and has no long-term consequences. 
Similarly, some of the items that are called “investment” in the 
usual statistical compilations might not be particularly productive 
capital goods in real life.  The theory, of course, implies that private 
firms will choose to finance only those investments that are expected 
to have a rate of return that exceeds the borrowing rate of interest.  
Thus, the market on its own should police the use of funds for 
unproductive purposes.  Theory, as always, has only an imperfect 
connection to reality; and there are far too many examples of gross 
over-investment in capital goods that turn out to be useless (empty 
office buildings and strip malls, to name two prominent examples) 
simply to assume that every dollar of investment that might be 
crowded out would have been spent on capital goods that would pay a 
high rate of return.60
Finally, this last point raises the possibility that an economy can 
be at a saturation point when it comes to private investment.61  At an 
extreme, there is a point where increases in the stock of capital goods 
have such a low payoff that they are not worth it even from the 
standpoint of paying to maintain those same capital goods.  In such a 
case, the government’s policymakers should not be locked into a view 
that presumes that more private investment is and must always be the 
goal of fiscal policy.  More generally, fiscal policy should at least take 
 60 See, e.g., EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra note 51, at 66 n.25 (1997) 
(“Resources may well have been wasted on half-empty shopping centers and office 
buildings, on misguided investment in steel capacity, and on nuclear power plants that 
proved uneconomical.”). 
 61 David M. Cutler et al., An Aging Society: Opportunity or Challenge? 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 68 (1990) (noting commentary by Robert 
Gordon that, at that time, there was adequate saving — even after taking account of 
budget deficits — to keep the United States from suffering declines in living 
standards). 
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account of the possibility of private investment being misdirected into 
unproductive ventures. 
2.  Is Government Spending Really Worse than Private Spending? 
In addition to the question of whether the private spending that is 
crowded out by a budget deficit would have raised future living 
standards, there is an even more central question of whether the 
government has purchased productive capital of its own.  This 
possibility, which is at the core of the view of deficits that focuses on 
public investment, highlights the other hidden assumption behind the 
view that a $300 billion deficit crowds out $300 billion of investment. 
As the discussion above noted, it is it unclear that a deficit 
automatically results in the government borrowing money from 
private entities who would have spent it on capital goods — or if they 
would have spent the money on capital goods, that those capital goods 
would necessarily have been productive.  Even if the spending that 
was crowded out would have resulted in productive private 
investment, though, it could still be better for the government to run a 
deficit if the government’s spending would result in investment that 
was even more productive than the private investment that it crowded 
out. 
To illustrate, if the government’s borrowing prevented private 
businesses from engaging in buying items that would have had a 
healthy rate of return of, say, 5% per year, the government could 
invest in something that has a higher payoff.  Public investments in 
early-childhood health and nutrition, next-generation technologies 
(medical and industrial), alternative energy systems, and improved 
public education (both pre-college and university level), among 
others, are all likely to have very handsome long-term payoffs,62 with 
the possibility of double-digit annual rates of return.63  If so, then 
there is not only no harm from running a deficit to spend money on 
 62 William T. Dickens et al., The Effects of Investing in Early Education on 
Economic Growth, in BROOKINGS POL’Y BRIEF 153 (Apr. 2006) (describing a 
universal preschool program and a model of its effects on GDP if adopted 
nationwide, estimating an increase in GDP in 2080 of over $2 trillion (in 2005 dollars) 
— an increase of about 3.5 % — and that in 2080, predicting that the program will 
generate a net fiscal surplus of $341 billion for the federal government). 
 63 ART ROLNICK & ROB GRUNEWALD, FED. RESERVE BD. OF MINNEAPOLIS, 
EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH A HIGH PUBLIC 
RETURN 9, tbl. 1B (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.mpls.frb.org/pubs/fedgaz/03-
03/earlychild.cfm?js=0 (showing a total estimated real internal rate of return of 16% 
for the a universal preschool program). 
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such things, but actually a net benefit to ourselves and to future 
generations.  Future economic output due to the government’s 
investment will actually be higher than it would have been if there had 
been no crowding out of private investment. 
This possibility has long been well understood by 
macroeconomists.  Blinder, for example, notes that “government 
investments . . . entail expenditures today in order to reap returns 
tomorrow,”64 referring to evidence that the United States has 
underinvested in public infrastructure capital such as “roads, bridges, 
airports, and waste treatment  facilities” and that such investments 
have high rates of return.65  He also noted that “prenatal care, 
postnatal care, and preschool education have very high rates of return 
[but] the benefits come much later.”66  Similarly, Robert Gordon has 
argued that the “real problem for policy . . . is the lack of public 
investment.”67
Of course, the government might not invest in high-return 
projects and it might not even invest at all.  Certainly, there are plenty 
of examples of government waste, including the now-infamous 
“Bridge to Nowhere” in Alaska, which was financed by Congress — 
notwithstanding extensive public ridicule — at a cost of $223 million 
in 2005, even though it would benefit fewer than fifty people.68  This 
hardly provides reassurance to those who suspect that the process by 
which government spending decisions are made is fundamentally 
broken. 
Moreover, even government spending projects that are not 
wasteful (in the strict sense of providing little or no benefit to anyone) 
might simply not be an investment in the future, such as paying 
slightly more to subsidize higher-quality meals at an employee 
cafeteria for a government agency.  Such spending can be defended as 
something better than sending Congressmen to play golf abroad, but it 
should almost certainly be paid for with current tax revenues rather 
than with borrowed funds that might otherwise be spent on 
productive private investments. 
Even if one is skeptical of the government’s ability to restrict itself 
to high-productivity investments, though, the situation may not be 
 64 Blinder, supra note 38, at 221. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 222. 
 67 Cutler et al., supra note 61. 
 68 Rebecca Claren, A Bridge to Nowhere, SALON, Aug. 9, 2005, http://archive. 
salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/09/bridges (citing $941 million cost of controversial 
projects for Alaska, of which $223 million was earmarked for that particular bridge). 
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symmetric.  That is, even if most spending increases do end up buying 
wasteful or low-productivity items, that does not mean that spending 
decreases as part of deficit reduction plans will only (or even mostly) 
cut the worst items first.  The same pork-barrel mentality that creates 
the waste in the first place can also protect it — and once it is in place, 
it is arguably more difficult to end a program upon which some people 
can now claim to be relying.  Cuts in spending might therefore come 
not from eliminating the waste but from reducing spending that helps 
the politically weak. 
As the discussion below demonstrates, at least the latter concern 
is very real.  A general atmosphere in which political points are 
earned by cutting the deficit can lead to harmful cuts in public 
investment.  Because of this possibility, a more nuanced view of 
government spending and deficit reduction is necessary. 
3.  Government Spending on Basic Research 
Barry Bluestone, an economist at Northeastern University, has 
described how former President Clinton’s fiscal policies elevated 
deficit reduction over what he viewed as intelligent spending on future 
productivity.69  Discussing Clinton’s deficit reduction policies, 
Bluestone took issue with the idea — based unmistakably on the 
standard story of budget deficits, or what Bluestone and his frequent 
co-author Bennett Harrison called “the Wall Street–Pennsylvania 
Avenue Accord” — that deficit reductions in the 1990s were the cause 
of the economic prosperity during that decade (a decade that saw the 
longest uninterrupted economic expansion of the post-World War II 
era).70  Bluestone characterized Clinton and his advisors as having 
concluded that “if reducing deficits is good, cutting them to zero must 
be better, and running outright surpluses must be best of all.”71
Bluestone pointed out that productivity growth had actually 
bottomed out in the 1981–82 recession and that it had risen from the 
low reached during the Carter years (0.8 % per year), reaching a 
higher average growth rate under each succeeding presidential 
administration: 1.6% under Reagan, 1.7% under George H.W. Bush, 
and 2.1% under Clinton.72  Under President George W. Bush’s 
 69 Barry Bluestone & Jonathan Chait, Clinton’s Bequest Reconsidered, 11 AM. 
PROSPECT 18, 19 (2000) (disagreeing, in an exchange between the co-authors, on the 
causes of economic prosperity during the Clinton years). 
 70 Id. at 18. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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administration, even with the return to annual deficits, productivity 
growth has averaged 3.2% per year for the first half-decade of this 
century.73  With improvement occurring during periods in which the 
deficit both rose and fell,74 Bluestone argued that is difficult to see a 
clear correlation between Clinton’s policies and economic growth — a 
correlation that is just as difficult to discern, if not more so, from the 
statistics for the years since Bluestone wrote. 
Notably, Bluestone agrees with the broad conclusions of the 
standard story of budget deficits: “Of course, if we had continued to 
pile up deficits in excess of 4 % of GDP, the escalating debt would 
have eventually stymied growth.”75  Nevertheless, he argues that the 
typical crowding out story reverses cause and effect: “High 
productivity growth . . . begets lower interest rates,”76 not the other 
way around.  “With or without the fiscal conservatism of the [Clinton] 
administration, the economy would be in pretty good shape today.”77
What, then, causes high productivity growth?  Rather than being 
the result of low budget deficits or low interest rates, Bluestone 
suggests that the prosperity of the nineties was due to policies that had 
been adopted in previous decades, in particular those policies that had 
enabled the breakthroughs in information technology that were 
beginning to be felt in the economy most strongly in late 1990s.78  
While there is an inevitable delay between the introduction of a 
“startling new technology” and its payoff in productivity growth, 
“[t]he full-scale productivity premium is only just now being 
realized.”79
The explosion in information technology had begun in university 
laboratories and private companies, but “much of the initiative and 
funding for this research came from the government.”80  
Unfortunately, as part of the focus on fiscal conservatism, the federal 
 73 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, PRODUCTIVITY & COSTS, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/prod_nr.htm#2006 (showing annual productivity 
growth in the business sector from 2001 through 2005 of 2.2%, 4.3%, 4.1%, 3.1%, and 
2.3%). 
 74 CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA tbl. 13 (2006),  
available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.pdf (showing highly variable deficits 
in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). 
 75 Bluestone & Chait, supra note 69, at 18. 
 76 Id. at 18–19. 
 77 Id. at 19. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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government under Clinton slashed funding for basic research, public 
infrastructure, education, and training.81  The federal share of 
spending on research and development continued its drop from 
roughly 50% in 1979 to 26.7% in 1999.82  This share bottomed out in 
the year 2000 when Bluestone’s article was published,83 but by 2004 
the share was still slightly below 30%.84
More broadly, Bluestone argued that “the single most important 
factor behind long cycles of prosperity is the level of technological 
advance”85 and that research that leads to long-term technological 
advances is so speculative and so hard to finance that “only the 
federal government has the means and the patience to do this.”86  He 
concluded that “Clinton’s larger legacy has been to paralyze public 
investment.”87
In short, Bluestone’s concern was a version of the “baby with the 
bathwater” phenomenon.  He would gladly have the federal 
government eliminate waste and maybe raise taxes to move closer to 
budget balance, but he deplored the loss of public support for the 
government’s funding of basic research that accompanied Clinton’s 
obsession with deficit reduction. 
4.  Correct Measurements and Public Investment 
Starting in 1984, the late Robert Eisner (and a frequent co-author, 
Paul Pieper) wrote a series of articles that attempted to describe the 
shortcomings of the government’s methods of deficit accounting and 
that argued for a general reduction in public hysteria about budget 
deficits.88  Although much of the work was technical, Eisner’s major 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NATIONAL PATTERNS OF R&D RESOURCES tbl. 2, 
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06327/pdf/tab2.pdf (showing the federal 
share of research and development spending at 24.8% in 2000). 
 84 Id. (revised figures showing that in 2004, the latest year available, the federal 
share of research and development spending was 29.9%). 
 85 Bluestone & Chait, supra note 69, at 19. 
 86 Id. at 19–20. 
 87 Id. at 20. 
 88 Robert Eisner & Paul J. Pieper, A New View of the Federal Debt and Budget 
Deficits, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1984, at 11; see also EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra 
note 51, at 3–28, 57–58.  For a list of Eisner’s other papers on this subject, see Neil H. 
Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy: Three Essays 101–02, 153–54, 220 (Aug. 
5, 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Buchanan, Dissertation]. 
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point was that there was no reason to believe that the best fiscal policy 
was to balance the annual budget. 
In particular, Eisner pointed out that “balance” has many 
different meanings, and in the context of debt, the most appropriate 
way to assess balance or imbalance would be to look at the debt as a 
percentage of national income.89  Balance would then best describe a 
situation where a government’s debt as a percentage of its national 
income remains unchanged from year to year, such that a growing 
economy can be in balance if the government’s debt grows at the same 
rate as national income grows.90  The annual deficit, in such a 
situation, would be positive, but the budget would be “balanced” in 
the sense that the debt-to-income ratio would be stable from year to 
year. 
As Eisner noted, there is nothing about any particular debt-to-
income ratio that recommends it over any other.91  His point was that 
there is no persuasive reason to worry about balancing the annual 
budget with a zero deficit, since that actually implies a shrinking debt-
to-income ratio over time.  There is, moreover, nothing special about 
zero total government debt as a goal.  It, too, is arbitrary. 
Eisner was also prominent in advocating the use of a deficit 
measure that adjusts each year’s deficit to account for the health of 
the economy.  Because an economy in recession is likely to cause an 
increase in the budget deficit,92  fixation on the deficit can lead to 
perverse spirals in which a recession causes an increase in the deficit, 
the government cuts spending and raises taxes to attack the deficit, 
and those contractionary policies in turn worsen the recession and 
lead to further deficits.93
For the purposes of long-term analysis, of course, transitory shifts 
in budget deficits due to economic cycles are beside the point.  Over 
time, it is the trends in the economy that matter.  On this point, Eisner 
agreed with the economists cited above about the importance of 
public investment.  “Capital of all kinds — public and private, physical 
 89 His justification for the proposal is that the size of the economy determines 
the ability of the economy to carry its debt burden, much as a bank will lend larger 
sums of money to higher–income borrowers.  EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra note 51, 
at 9. 
 90 Id. at 9–10. 
 91 Id. at 12. 
 92 An increase in the budget deficit would be caused by the reduction in tax 
revenues when workers lose their jobs and the increases in government transfer 
payments to those former workers. 
 93 Id. 
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and intangible, human and nonhuman — contributes to future 
production.  If deficits add to our stock of productive capital, they 
actually help secure the future — for our children and 
grandchildren.”94
Eisner agreed that “[p]ublic investment can also be misguided, 
although there is increasing evidence that, in general, the largely 
public investment in infrastructure and particularly in human capital 
has had a high payoff.”95  Like Bluestone, he argued that “[d]eficit 
paranoia and budget balancing mania can be dangerous, extremely 
dangerous, to our economic health.”96
Eisner’s contributions to our understanding of deficits, therefore, 
reinforce and extend the arguments discussed above.  Correcting the 
measurement errors would allow us to see more clearly the effects of 
our policies, but the big policy message remains that public investment 
must not become a casualty of deficit cutting policies.97
Attempts to focus attention on public investment, therefore, do 
not amount to a claim that “deficits do not matter” but rather to a call 
for greater clarity in what we are really arguing about.  Government 
borrowing for unproductive projects is harmful to future generations, 
but we cannot simply assume that deficit reduction by any means 
necessary will lead to an increase in net investment and thus in future 
prosperity. 
D.  What Do We Owe Future Generations? 
Finally, the discussion above has accepted for the sake of 
argument that it is always bad to enact policies that reduce the living 
standards of future generations.  The rhetoric of fiscal stewardship 
easily lends itself to this assumption, as it would feel odd indeed to 
argue that there is nothing irresponsible about reducing the wealth of 
our children and grandchildren. 
Nevertheless, if we are thinking about a choice between doing 
something that benefits people living today (even something 
undeniably frivolous) or denying ourselves that choice in order to 
benefit our progeny, we need to think very seriously about how to 
 94 Id. at 27. 
 95 Id. at 66 n.25. 
 96 Id. at 28. 
 97 See also Dickens et al., supra note 62, at 6 (“Because most of these benefits [of 
public investment] are longer-term while the costs of mounting the programs are 
more immediate, the political system tends to be biased against making such 
investments.”). 
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balance the interests of present and future generations.  In a future 
article, I will describe in much more detail the philosophical literature 
regarding intergenerational justice and will offer a proposed approach 
to balancing present and future interests. 
For present purposes, however, it is perhaps sufficient simply to 
emphasize that discussion of this question is almost entirely absent 
from the policy literature on budget deficits.  Eisner and others 
regularly argue that their policies are the best for truly guaranteeing 
the prosperity of future generations,98 yet there is little if any 
discussion of why we must do so.  Eisner at least raised the issue and 
questioned seriously whether it is right to engage in policies 
(especially reductions in benefits for elderly Americans) that will 
benefit future generations, particularly when those future generations 
are likely to be much wealthier than we are.99  The rhetoric of “future 
generations,” though, permeates discussions of long-term deficits.100
Similarly, I raised the intergenerational equity issue briefly in a 
working paper in early 2004,101 to which Daniel Shaviro responded 
briefly later that year.102  I included a very brief discussion of the issue 
in a subsequent article, including a response to Shaviro.103  Despite 
these very scant acknowledgements of the issue, the glaring fact is that 
this question of intergenerational equity in fiscal policy remains highly 
under-theorized.  The discussion in this article should be viewed in 
that light, with my full acknowledgement that I (like almost everyone 
else who discusses budget deficits) am accepting the normative 
standard that “harming future generations” should be avoided — even 
if any harm that we might cause would still leave the living standards 
 98 “Capital of all kinds — public and private, physical and intangible, human and 
nonhuman — contributes to future production.  If deficits add to our stock of 
productive capital, they actually help secure the future — for our children and 
grandchildren.”  Id. at 27. 
 99 EISNER, DEFICIT SCARES, supra note 51, at 57–58. 
 100 See, e.g., Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 2, at 322–25 and sources 
discussed therein. 
 101 Neil H. Buchanan, What Is Fiscal Responsibility? Long–Term Deficits, 
Generational Accounting, and Capital Budgeting 38–43 (Rutgers Univ. (Newark) 
Legal Working Paper Series, Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://law.bepress. 
com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art8 (hereinafter Buchanan, Fiscal Responsibility). 
 102 Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration’s Policy of 
Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1285, 1330–33 
(2004).  Shaviro does not cite my unpublished article, but the issues he raises are 
found in that piece. 
 103 Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 2, at 323–24. 
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of future generations much higher than today’s living standards.104  In 
future work, I will explore in detail the philosophical and practical 
questions of intergenerational justice, focusing in particular on how to 
balance the interests of unborn generations with those of currently 
living human beings.105
III. A NOBLE DECEPTION? 
If the discussion above is persuasive, it would suggest that we 
should immediately change our policy rhetoric and openly discuss the 
possibility that increases in deficits (or the refusal to take certain 
measures to decrease deficits, such as cutting valuable research funds) 
are wise public policy.  If, after all, it is possible to borrow money at 
rates of 5% or 6% and spend the money on a project with a 16% rate 
of return,106 it would seem perverse not to borrow the money and to 
make the investment. 
A very real danger, however, lies in a possible response by the 
public and politicians upon learning that deficits really are not always 
a bad thing.  If believed, this news could plausibly lead to a relaxation 
of our collective vigilance against the bad kind of deficits.  What if, 
say, we engage in new public investments that would together raise 
future GDP by 10% in 2017 but, in so doing, we open the door to bad 
investments that crowd out enough private investment to decrease 
GDP by 20% over that time period?  We would clearly have been 
better off to pretend that there never were any attractive public 
investments for which we might have borrowed. 
While such thought experiments are useful, they of course cannot 
be tested.  Should prudent, well-meaning analysts nevertheless 
conclude that the risks are too great — that our public discourse 
should proceed without acknowledging the potential benefits of good 
deficits as a defense against the unleashing of too much bad deficit 
spending?  I am not responding here to a specific proposal; I can cite 
no serious analyst who has directly articulated in print an argument 
that we should consciously deceive people about the availability of 
 104 Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security and Long-Term Deficits: When Should We 
Worry? 92 CORN. L. REV. 257, 266 (2007) (hereinafter Buchanan, Social Security) 
(showing that even pessimistic assumptions result in estimated real standards of living 
in 2080 being 131% higher than in 2005). 
 105 The leading philosophical exploration of questions of intergenerational justice 
is DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1986); see also TIM MULGAN, FUTURE 
PEOPLE (2006). 
 106 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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public investment.107  I raise the point here simply because it is the 
only remaining plausible argument against debating publicly the value 
of deficits.  If opportunities to spend public money productively exist, 
and if our current policy debate largely proceeds as if those 
opportunities do not exist, then we must either change the debate or 
explain why we choose not to do so. 
There is plenty of room for reasonable people to disagree on such 
an inherently difficult judgment call, of course, but I am ultimately 
persuaded that we should simply proceed honestly.  First, this is 
hardly a matter about which the facts are difficult to find.  The 
citations in this article are just a handful from the extensive literature 
on public investment that exists and that is available to any interested 
party.108
It would thus not be plausible for tax policy scholars, economists, 
or indeed anyone with an interest in affecting fiscal policy to sustain a 
public posture that borrowing to finance public investment is never a 
good idea.  If directly challenged about that posture, the most that one 
could say is that, yes, there are most likely productive public 
investments available, but we should not avail ourselves of them.  If 
that is the nuanced conversation that we must have, though, then it 
would be far better simply to say that we are going to look for good 
public investments and that we must also be ever vigilant not to 
 107 Proposals to account specifically for public investment have, however, been 
met with skeptical resistance, not because public investment projects are unavailable 
but because of a concern that a system that allows government spending to be 
classified as “investment” is dangerously open to abuse.  See, e.g., Karen Pennar, 
Beware of Accounting Magic Tricks, Mr. Clinton, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 18, 1993, at 55.  
Along similar lines, economist Paul Krugman recently suggested that, even though he 
is in favor of reducing budget deficits, it would be better for Democrats to spend any 
savings or tax increases that they can find rather than reducing the deficit.  The better 
path, he suggests, is to act as if we do not care about reducing the deficit because 
other politicians might one day squander whatever savings the current Congress 
might find.  Paul Krugman, Democrats and the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at 
A35 (“Deficit reduction . . . might just end up playing into the hands of our next 
irresponsible president.”). 
 108 In earlier unpublished work, I described in theoretical terms the concept of 
public investment and some attempts to measure the amount of public investment 
that is undertaken by the federal government.  See Buchanan, Fiscal Responsibility, 
supra note 101, at 38–43; see also Buchanan, Dissertation, supra note 88, at ch. 1; 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, State-Specific Estimates of State and Local Government Capital, 
23 REGIONAL SCI. & URBAN ECON. 185 (1993).  In future work, I will analyze the 
broader literature on public investment as a step toward advocating that the federal 
government adopt a system of accounts that would allow public investment to be 
financed without increasing the reported deficit. 
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borrow money for foolish reasons.  If we cannot maintain the pretense 
that deficits are unmistakably bad, then we gain nothing by pretending 
otherwise. 
Consider the attempt by former presidential candidate Al Gore in 
2000 to describe the surpluses in the Social Security trust funds as a 
“lock box” in which our future retirement security was safeguarded.109  
The problem was that this was “an accounting gimmick,”110 and it later 
became possible for President George W. Bush to attempt to secure 
public support for his misbegotten plan to create private accounts in 
Social Security by claiming that “[t]here is no trust ‘fund’ — just 
IOUs.”111  While all analogies are imperfect, and while Bush’s attempt 
to use the Democrats’ misrepresentation of the trust funds to rally 
support for his privatization plan failed, this at least suggests that the 
consequences of well-meaning deceptions are at best unpredictable 
and at worst corrosive to public policy discussion.112
Finally, the distributive consequences of forsaking public 
investments ultimately make the noble deception appear far less 
noble.  As suggested above,113 some of the best existing and 
prospective public investments most directly benefit the young, the 
weak, and the poor before ultimately benefiting the entire economy.  
Choosing not to make those investments means quite deliberately 
choosing not to help those vulnerable populations in the name of 
avoiding some possibly bad choices that we should try to avoid in any 
case.  While it is imaginable that the net crowding out of private 
investment that could result from poor policy choices could end up 
being as or more harmful to the politically weak as it would be to fail 
to invest directly in their futures, there are no apparent reasons to 
think that those possible consequences are as large or as direct as are 
the losses from failing to undertake the direct public investments that 
would clearly benefit them. 
In short, we should not deny or ignore the evidence that there are 
 109 Robert Kuttner, Getting Over the Lock Box, in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 
(online edition), Sept. 2, 2001 (“Politically, Gore’s strategists thought that by putting 
the Social Security reserves off budget, and forcing George W. Bush to take the 
“lock-box” pledge, they would make it impossible for Bush to eat into the surplus 
with a large tax cut.”). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Associated Press, Bush: Social Security Trust Fund “Just IOUs” (Apr. 5, 
2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7393649. 
 112 For a discussion of the Social Security trust funds and the long-term health of 
the Social Security system, see Buchanan, Social Security, supra note 104. 
 113 Supra Part II.C.2. 
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and will continue to be opportunities to make wise public investments 
using borrowed funds.  We gain nothing in the public debate by 
pretending otherwise, and we risk harming those whom we should 
least wish to harm. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The political fascination with budget deficits in the United States 
has led to a great deal of posturing and confusion about the nature of 
our fiscal obligations and the best approach for advancing the 
interests of future generations.  We have reached a point where, with 
occasional strategic exceptions, the bipartisan default position is that 
all deficits are bad, all the time.  Any good economist knows that that 
is false. 
The standard story about how deficits affect the economy through 
“crowding out,” of course, does suggest that budget deficits can harm 
the economy, under certain conditions — but it also contains (or is at 
least not inconsistent with) an alternative story in which deficits are 
beneficial to the long-term health of the economy.  The most 
important way in which reality deviates from the standard story is in 
the composition of private and public spending.  Crowding out is 
harmful when a government spends its money on items that would fail 
to raise future productivity while preventing private parties from 
buying such productive items.  This does not mean, though, that 
budget deficits are always bad.  It simply means that we should be 
sure that the deficit is used to finance public investments that will 
increase future productivity.  Conversely, we should be especially 
vigilant to prevent budget cuts (motivated by a “deficits are always 
bad” mentality) from resulting in the elimination of government 
spending on important investments, such as supporting education and 
basic research and providing assistance to vulnerable populations like 
very young children at risk of malnutrition or disease. 
Recognizing and discussing these opportunities for public 
investment does, however, raise the risk that the policy discussion will 
become dangerously muddled.  Having opened the door to claims that 
some deficits are good, there is at least a possibility that this could 
become an opening to justify further increases in the deficit that are 
harmful.  Ambiguity can be the enemy of sustained political will.  
Despite this risk, the arguments in favor of deficit-financed public 
investment are too well known, and the consequences of deception 
too great (especially for the politically vulnerable members of our 
society), to justify a strategy of pretending that the benefits of budget 
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deficits do not exist. 
Budget deficits matter, but they matter in ways that differ 
importantly from the conventional wisdom.  We must make sure that 
any attempts to measure or reduce budget deficits do not mislead us 
into taking actions that might actually make things worse both for us 
and for our progeny. 
 
